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This paper investigates the predictions of the theory of optimal seigniorage in 
developing countries over the period 1970-1999. The tax smoothing hypothesis, tested on 
forty selected developing countries, is rejected. However, the hypothesis that economies with 
high levels of expenditure and taxation also have high levels of inflation tax, tested on the 
forty selected developing countries and on a larger sample (up to 112 developing countries) 
can not be rejected. 
 






Cet article analyse, empiriquement, les prédictions de la théorie du seigneuriage 
optimal dans le contexte des pays en développement sur la période 1970-1999. L'hypothèse 
du lissage fiscal, testée sur un échantillon sélectif de quarante pays en développement, est 
rejetée. Cependant, l'hypothèse testée sur ces quarante pays et sur un échantillon plus large 
(jusqu'à 112 pays en développement), selon laquelle les pays qui ont des taux de dépenses et 
de prélèvements publics élevés ont également des taux de taxe d'inflation élevés ne peut pas 
être rejetée. 
 
Mots-clef: Seigneuriage optimal, lissage fiscal, pays en développement, tests de racine 
unitaire en panel, GMM  
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Introduction 
The government can have an important role in the economy by investing in human 
capital and infrastructure. Spending is necessary to improve the environment for private sector 
development and sustained economic growth. The government can finance its spending, 
mainly, by three methods: conventional taxes, borrowing and issuing money
1. The methods of 
financing public spending are not neutral. The same amount of public spending can, 
fundamentally, have different effects on private sector and economic efficiency depending on 
the nature of spending and the method of financing. One method of financing considered 
particularly distortionary is seigniorage. 
Seigniorage is government revenue from issuing money base. This increase of money 
supply is a source of inflation. That is why the term inflation tax is used. The growth of base 
money decreases the real value of money already issued. Inflation is then considered as a tax, 
which hits money base holders. By analogy, the rate of inflation is considered to be a tax rate, 
and the real base money is considered to be a tax base.  There are, however, differences 
between seigniorage and inflation tax. In a growing economy, a part of seigniorage depends 
on an increase in real money demand.  
Seigniorage is an important source of government revenue for many developing 
countries. However, the level of inflation tax and, of seigniorage vary among developing 
countries. How can the variability of inflation and of seigniorage between countries be 
explained? There are two main theoretical explanations. According to the first theory, based 
on the Phillips curve, government's objective function depends positively on the employment 
rate and negatively on the inflation rate. Unanticipated inflation with nominal wage contracts 
reduces real wages and thereby lowers real labor cost for employers. This lower cost 
                                                 
1 Government could have non-tax revenues, these revenues are important in oil producing countries (for 
example Kuwait).  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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encourages an increase in employment and consequently output. However, this creates 
positive inflation expectations, which result in an inflation bias. Private agents know that 
government has incentives to increase inflation rates, thus they do not have confidence in low 
inflation rates. In order to prevent a large increase in unemployment the government must 
validate the anticipations of private agents (see Kydland and Prescot [1977] and Barro and 
Gordon [1983]). For small open economies in developing countries, this argument could be 
expressed slightly differently. Salaries are not the main method of labor remuneration. A large 
part of the latter is constituted of benefits which determine the relative price of non tradable 
goods (or the real exchange rate). In the presence of flexible exchange rates, the monetary 
authority has an incentive to inflate. The resulting nominal depreciation of the exchange rate 
could lead to the depreciation of the real exchange rate if the inflation is not fully anticipated. 
In export-orientated industry, the latter developments can lead to increase exports that will 
enhance the economy and reduce the balance of trade deficit. However, if the inflation rate is 
anticipated by private agents, the government has to validate these anticipations leading to an 
inflation bias and to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Thus, in a flexible exchange 
regime, there is permanent inflation due to the credibility constraint (S.&P. Guillaumont, 
1995). 
The second theory is the monetary financing of public spending. Recent research in 
this field has developed along two main lines. The first of these focuses on the temptation to 
effect resource transfers from the private sector to the government through an unanticipated 
inflation. This theory deals only with the rate of inflation that maximizes the government 
revenue à la Cagan (1956). The rate of inflation that maximizes the government revenue is 
different between countries, this explains the difference in inflation rates between countries. 
However, the rate of inflation that maximizes government's revenue could be very high and 
for some countries there is no  Laffer relationship (Easterly, Mauro and Schmidt-Hebbel, CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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1995). The second stresses a dynamic aspect of the public-finance problem, and focuses on 
the optimal distribution of inflation over time and across all other available taxes to finance an 
exogenous amount of public spending. If one admits that in the real world "sum-lump" taxes 
are not available, that is to says all taxes imply distortions and if one considers inflation tax 
like any other conventional tax, then the theory of optimal seigniorage may be the most 
appropriate.  
The theory of optimal taxation, implies that marginal deadweight losses should be 
equated across all available taxes (Ramsey, 1927) and time periods (Barro, 1979). Recently, 
these theories have been extended to models of optimum seigniorage and conventional 
taxation. Originally Phelps (1973) developed a model in which monetary and fiscal policies 
were coordinated to minimize the total excess burden of financing an exogenous amount of 
government spending. This theory has enjoyed renewed interest since Mankiw (1987), Grilli 
(1989), Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) and Trehan and Walsh (1990) developed models in 
which seigniorage and conventional taxes were set to minimize deadweight losses across all 
available taxes and time periods. When other taxes imply high deadweight losses and/or when 
the administrations costs to collect conventional taxes are high, government should use both 
conventional taxes and seigniorage to minimize the distortions of all available taxes. In many 
developing countries one observes two common characteristics: (i) government revenue from 
issuing money base is an important source of financing public spending and (ii) social costs of 
conventional taxes are very high. In this study, we will analyze the variability of inflation tax 
across developing countries within the framework of the theory of optimal inflation tax.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will present 
the basic idea of the theory of the optimal seigniorage and its testable implications together 
with the presentation of some limits of this theory. In section 3, we will test the implications 
of the theory of optimal seigniorage. First, we will test Barro's hypothesis, namely the CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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hypothesis of revenue smoothing (tax and seigniorage smoothing). Then, we test the 
implications of Phelps hypothesis, namely the positive correlation between seigniorage and 
public spending and seigniorage and government tax rate. The last section contains the 
conclusion. 
I.  The theory of optimal seigniorage  
Background  
Research, on monetary policy, has focused on the optimal rate of inflation since 
Friedman work in 1969. According to Friedman, optimal monetary policy, defined as one that 
maximizes the consumer surplus, is characterized by a nominal interest rate equal to zero, 
corresponding to a negative inflation rate. This rate of inflation is called the "Friedman rule". 
This rule was justified with the first best argument that the price charged for the use of real 
balances should be set equal t o the production cost, which is approximately zero. The 
conditions under which the Friedman rule holds, have been the subject of intense academic 
debate over the past 30 years. Historically, Phelps (1973) following an approach à la Ramsey 
(1927) was the first to challenge the relevance of Friedman’s (1969) result by arguing that, in 
a second best world where government expenditures must be financed with distortionary 
taxes, liquidity should be taxed as any other good. With this approach, one searches for the 
rate of inflation that minimizes the deadweight losses of all taxes, and not the rate of inflation 
that maximize the government revenue à la Cagan (1956). According to Phelps, in the public 
finance context and when sum-lump taxes are not available, a positive rate of inflation could 
be optimal. According to this theory, the higher the deadweight losses of conventional taxes, 
the higher the rate of inflation.  
Barro (1979) further developed the theory of optimal taxation with the tax smoothing 
argument. If the marginal social cost of raising revenue is increasing in the tax rates, as one CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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would typically expect, the optimal fiscal policy entails smoothing tax rates over time. In 
Barro's model, government uses public debt (deficits) to smooth tax rates over time. Thereby, 
public debt finances transitory spending and taxes finance permanent spending.  
Direct extensions of the tax smoothing argument à la Barro (1979) and the theory of 
optimal public finance à la Phelps (1973) are the models developed by Mankiw (1987), Grilli 
(1989), Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) and Trehan and Walsh (1990). In these models, 
government raises revenue from two sources to finance an exogenous amount of public 
spending. The first source is a tax on output, such as an income tax or sale tax. The second 
source of revenue is seigniorage, the printing of new money. Both ways of raising revenue 
cause social losses. The government can use a combination of these two instruments to 
minimize the present value of these social losses subject to the intertemporal budget constraint 
(see for example, Mankiw, 1987 and Grilli, 1989). The optimal fiscal and monetary policy, 
resulting from this optimization exercise, satisfies three equations. The first equation equates 
the marginal social cost of taxation today and in the future. The second equates the marginal 
social cost of inflation today and in the future. These two equations express the tax smoothing 
argument à la Barro (1979). The third equates contemporaneously the marginal social cost of 
raising revenue through direct taxation and the marginal social cost of raising revenue through 
seigniorage. The latter equation expresses the argument à la Phelps (1973).  
Empirical implications  
The latter equation, which relates the tax rate to the rate of inflation, expresses a 
crucial implication of the theory of optimal seigniorage. In response to a permanent changes 
in government spending (a permanent exogenous shock on public spending), government uses 
both instruments. An increase in public spending implies higher levels of conventional taxes. 
To equate the marginal costs of conventional tax and seigniorage, an increase in seigniorage is 
required. Thus, seigniorage and conventional tax revenue move in the same direction. Hence CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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the level of inflation and the level of seigniorage moves together with the tax rate (tax 
revenue). This implies a positive relationship between seigniorage and tax revenue and 
seigniorage and public spending. Further, Grilli (1989) and Trehan and Walsh (1990), have 
pointed out that models à la Mankiw imply that both the inflation rate (seigniorage) and tax 
rate (tax revenue) should have a unit root and should be cointegrated. This is, of course, a 
result analogous to the random walk property of consumption derived by Hall (1978). This 
latter relationship is called revenue smoothing (tax and seigniorage smoothing). 
Thus, the theory of optimal inflation tax can be tested in two different manners. (i) The 
revenue smoothing hypothesis (tax and seigniorage smoothing). Seigniorage, tax revenue and 
government spending have a unit root and have cointegration relationships. (ii) The existence 
of a positive correlation between seigniorage and tax revenue and seigniorage and public 
spending. The former represents the Barro's tax smoothing argument and the latter represents 
the Phelps argument.  
The theory of optimal seigniorage is based on a simple idea, namely that government 
set public finance policy in order to minimize the social cost of different methods of financing 
public spending. However, this theory implies many implicit hypotheses some of them are 
unrealistic particularly in developing countries. In the next section, we will examine the 
greater shortcomings of the theory of optimal seigniorage which will allow us to better 
evaluate our empirical results. 
The limits of the theory of optimal seigniorage 
From the theoretical point of view, Kimbrough (1986) showed that if we consider 
money as an intermediate good, that is to say money reduces transaction costs, the argument à 
la Phelps (1973) w ill not necessary imply that a positive inflation rate is optimal. Thus 
depending on the hypothesis of money, (intermediate or final good) predictions can change. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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Végh (1989), however, showed that if marginal costs of conventional taxes are increasing, it 
is still optimal to have a positive inflation rate. 
The theory of optimal seigniorage supposes that there is perfect coordination between 
the fiscal and monetary authorities, monetary creation is only for fiscal purposes
2 and the 
stock of monetary base is a free instrument of the fiscal policy. In some countries there are 
institutional constraints limiting monetary creation. For example, countries of CFA franc 
zones
3. In countries with currency board, monetary creation is beyond governmental control, 
because it depends on international transactions (the global balance).  
In a fixed exchange rate regime, the monetary authority has to defend the parity of 
money. If the stability of the exchange rate is also an objective of the monetary policy, 
monetary authority will probably choose an inflation rate which is different from that 
predicted by the theory of optimal seigniorage. Fischer (1982), shows that a fixed exchange 
regime is more disciplinary than a flexible one. If the exchange regime is part of the optimal 
policy of the government, its cost should be included in the government's objective function 
(Grilli, 1989). 
Furthermore, the revenue smoothing hypothesis (tax and seigniorage smoothing) is 
based on very strong implicit hypotheses which are unrealistic for developing countries. In 
developing countries, a number of inherent institutional characteristic must be taken into 
account. Edwards et Tabellini (1991) outlined that one ought to take into account the fact that 
often the domestic capital market is not well developed. Hence most public borrowing must 
be sought from abroad, using external debt. This introduces two complications that may 
change the nature of optimal policy. Firstly, developing countries generally face credit 
constraints in international capital markets. Secondly, to the extend that they can borrow 
                                                 
2 According to Cukierman (1993), an expansionary monetary policy could be used for four main reasons: 
Employment, revenue, balance of payment and financial stability (interest rate smoothing).  
3 The credits of Central banks to governments are limited to 20% of the government tax revenues.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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abroad, they can only borrow in foreign currency; this means that external debt may increase 
exposure to exchange rate risk or terms of trade risk. Both these complications presumably 
weaken the r evenue smoothing principle, since they raise the cost of issuing public debt. 
However, they do not alter the prescription that the inflation tax should covary positively with 
other tax rates and with the levels of public spending.  
Finally, inflation tax could react as a "residual source of government revenue" (Click, 
1998). It increases as the other sources of revenue decrease, thus inflation tax will not finance 
permanent government spending, it only finances the transitory part of public spending. In 
this case, there is no relationship between permanent government spending and the correlation 
between the tax rate and inflation tax is negative. This effect is increased by the exogenous 
volatility of tax revenue of developing countries exporting raw materials (Honahan, 1996). 
Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) argue that there is a difference between the two sources of 
revenue: the conventional taxes cannot be adjusted quickly (as usually they must be voted by 
the legislators) while inflation tax can be adjusted quickly in response to a temporary increase 
in government spending. However, the correlation (negative or positive) between inflation tax 
and conventional tax should be interpreted with caution. A reverse causality could appear due 
to Olivera (1967) and Tanzi (1977) effect. Empirical tests of the theory of optimal seigniorage 
must take into account the problem of reverse causality. 
II.  Empirical evidences 
Review of previous empirical literature  
Mankiw (1987) argues that the theory of optimal seigniorage performs relatively well 
in explaining the behavior of nominal interest rates and inflation in the postwar USA data. His 
conclusion is based on the finding that the inflation rate (and the nominal interest rate) and the 
average tax rate are indeed positively and significantly correlated. Amano (1998) provides CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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empirical evidence on the validity of the optimal seigniorage hypothesis for Canada and the 
USA over the 1953 to 1993 period. Poterba and Rotemberg (1990), on the other hand, raise 
some doubts about the generality of this theory. They extended Mankiw's analysis to 
Japanese, German, French and UK data, and found that a significant positive correlation is 
present only in the Japanese data.  
Trehan and Walsh (1990), tested the cointegration relationship between inflation and 
tax rate in the U.S. data over the period 1914-1986. They found that these two variables are 
nonstationary. However, they found very weak evidence of a cointegration relationship 
between these two variables. This suggests that revenue-smoothing considerations have not 
been significant elements in determining the behavior of seigniorage. Grilli (1989) and Dupuy 
(1993) tested the cointegration relationship between seigniorage and the tax; and seigniorage 
and public spending in an European context. Both studies showed mitigated results. Edwards 
and Tabillini (1991) tested the cointegration relationship of 21 developing countries. They 
rejected the implications of this theory. 
De Haan, Zelhorst and Roukens (1993) analyzed seigniorage in a sample of  42 
developing countries. They found a positive correlation between public spending and 
seigniorage. In addition, Campillo and Miron (1996) examined data from 62 countries and 
concluded that their results are consistent with the view that optimal tax considerations are 
important in determining inflation rates. Click (1998) analyzed the seigniorage in a cross-
section of developing and developed countries and found that average government spending is 
not a determinant of seigniorage.  
This review of the empirical literature shows that even if the theory of optimal 
seigniorage has sound foundations , there are many doubts concerning the behavior of 
governments in the real world. Two studies test the theory of optimal seigniorage in the 
context of developing countries: the results are contradictory. Thus, an empirical investigation CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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of the theory of optimal seigniorage in developing countries, in which the different 
predications are tested, is merited. In this study, revenue smoothing hypothesis is tested using 
the new econometric tools for panel data, namely the panel unit root tests. The possible 
reverse causality between tax and seigniorage is corrected using the Generalized Method of 
Moment estimators (GMM system).  
Data and measurement of seigniorage  
Seigniorage versus inflation tax 
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Where p is the rate of inflation and g is the growth rate of the economy.  
                                                 
4Monetary base and GDP are in nominal term. If the real monetary base and GDP were used the results would be 
the same, as long as both variables are deflated with the GDP price index. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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Thus the seigniorage ( Y
M &
) has two components. The term  m p  is the inflation tax, by 
analogy p  is the tax rate and m represents the tax base. The term  gm reflects the increase in 
money demand due to the economic growth. The former is called "active seigniorage" and the 
latter is called "passive seigniorage" (Fisher, 1982). Thus the seigniorage is measured as the 
variation of the stock of the money base, during a given time period (year), as ratio of GDP 
( Y
M &
 or  Y
M D
). This measure is the most widely used in the literature: it is used, among others, 
by Cagan (1956), Marty (1968), Friedman (1971), Fischer (1982), Barro (1982), Cukierman, 
Edwards and Tabellini (1992) and Click (1998). 
However, one can argue that seigniorage and inflation tax have not the same 
distortions and the appropriate measure is the inflation tax. The inflation tax is then measured 




We will test the prediction of the theory of optimal seigniorage in developing 
countries using a l arge cross-section times series data. The data come from Government 
Financial Statistics (GFS), International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Development 
Indicators (WDI). To test the revenue smoothing implications of the theory of optimal 
seigniorage, long terms series data are required. In this study we imposed to the three 
variables (seigniorage, tax revenue and public spending) to have at least 20 observations by 
country. Only forty developing countries satisfied this restriction. Thus we tested the revenue 
smoothing hypothesis on these forty countries over the period 1970-1999. Then, the Phelps 
implications were tested on the forty selected developing countries and the analysis is 
extended to the whole sample (up to) 112 developing countries. For the implications of Phelps 
hypothesis, the investigation was based on the average levels of seigniorage over the whole 
period 1970-1999 (or as much of the period that was available) and over the three sub-periods 
                                                 
5For a discussion on the measure of seigniorage see Drazen [1985], Dupuy [1992] and Honahan [1996]. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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(1970-1979, 1980-1989 and 1990-1999), this subdivision will allow us to use panel data 
properties. 
Testing the revenue smoothing hypothesis  
As shown in Grilli (1989) and Trehan and Walsh (1990), the revenue smoothing 
hypothesis imply that (i) the variables are unit-root nonstationary and (ii) there are 
cointegration relationships between seigniorage and tax rates and seigniorage and public 
spending. The existence of nonstationarity by itself does not prove that the hypothesis under 
consideration is correct; nonstationarity as a result of revenue smoothing must also be shown
6. 
These considerations would imply a cointegration relationship between these variables. 
In this study we will use a panel unit root test based on individual unit root tests. The 
panel data unit root test suggested by Levin and Lin (1992, 1993) is based on a very 
restrictive hypothesis which is rarely ever of interest in practice. Namely, the homogeneity of 
roots across units. Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) relax the restrictive hypothesis of the Levin 
and Lin test, however several difficulties still remain. For example, the time dimension is the 
same for all the cross-section units. This test is not suitable for an unbalanced panel as is the 
case in this study. To overcome these difficulties, Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) 
propose a test developed by Fisher (1932) which is based on combining the p-values of the 
test-statistic for a unit root in each cross-sectional unit. The Fisher test is non-parametric, and 
may be combined for any arbitrary choice unit root test. It is an exact test and the statistic 




1 ) ln(p  
                                                 
6 Indeed, the unit root is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the tax smoothng hypothesis.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
  15 
is distributed as a Chi-squared variable with 2N degrees of freedom under the assumption of 
cross-sectional independence. pi is the p-value of the test statistic on unit i. This test can be 
used either for the units root or cointegration hypothesis
7. 
Results 
In order to conduct the panel unit root test, as described above, unit root tests for each 
country must firstly be conducted. Then take the p-value of each individual test (each country) 
to compute the statistic of panel unit root test. Thus, individual unit root test, for each country 
and for each variable, were performed (see Table I). Then, we computed the statistic of 
Maddala and Wu (MW) for each variable (Table II).  
For seigniorage, we rejected the null of unit root for most of the countries (column 3, 
Table I)). The MW statistic is explosive rejecting the necessary condition of the cointegration 
relationship
8. Thus, the "seigniorage smoothing" hypothesis is rejected. However, one can 
argue that inflation tax reflects better the distortions of monetary financing of public 
spending. We performed the individual unit root for inflation tax (column 4). For most 
countries, the variable is stationary. The MW test reject the null of unit root nonstationary 
(Table II). Thus the necessary condition of the cointegration relationship is rejected. There are 
non cointegration relationships between inflation tax and public spending and inflation tax 
and tax revenue
9. This result is probably due to the implicit hypotheses which are unrealistic 
in the context of developing countries, for example many developing countries have credit 
constraints.  
The other way to test the theory of optimal seigniorage is based on the equation that 
equates the marginal social cost of raising revenue through direct taxation and the marginal 
social cost of raising revenue through seigniorage for each period. In this case, the test 
                                                 
7 Therefore the null hypothesis to be tested is: H0 : all time series are unit root nonstationary; HA : At least one 
time series is stationary.  
8  For many countries the p-value is close to zero, the logarithm is vary high in absolute values. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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consists of searching for a positive correlation between seigniorage and the tax rate and 
seigniorage and public spending. These are the implications of the Phelps hypothesis. 
Testing the Phelps hypothesis  
Mankiw found a positive relationship between inflation (and nominal interest rate) and 
the taxation rate for US data. However, one can extend the predications of this model to the 
cross section analysis as mentioned by Mankiw (1987, p. 340):  
"ceteris paribus, economies with high levels of expenditure and taxation also have high 
inflation and nominal interest rates. Implementing of such a test, h owever, would likely 
require taking into account the cross national variation in the efficiency of the system of 
taxation". 
The problem is that the efficiency of a fiscal system is difficult to measure. Thus we have 
to use some proxies. The variables of control have to take into account the efficiency of the 
tax system. The following methodology was used.  
Si,t = a Xi,t + ?i  + ei,t  
Where S is the seigniorage, X is a set of control variables including the variable that 
reflects the theory of optimal seigniorage, ? represents a set of unobserved time-invariant 




As explained in section 2, we have two variables of interest:  public spending as a 
percentage of GDP and government tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. The two variables 
are expected to be positively correlated to seigniorage (to the inflation tax). 
                                                                                                                                                         
9 However, as shown in table I, for many countries public spending and the tax rate are unit-root nonstationary 
(column 1 and 2). For both variables, we can not reject the unit root null at any usual significance level. 
10 Time dummies can also be included in the equation to account for time-specific effects. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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We have, however, to control for the other variables reflecting partially the efficiency 
of tax system and tax administration. The following control variables are used. (i) Urban 
population as a percentage of total population. On the one hand, the urban sector is easier to 
tax, thus we can expect a negative relationship between urbanization and seigniorage 
(Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini, 1992). On the other hand, urbanization enhances 
underground and informal activities which are hard to tax. This last argument is the main 
hypothesis in the models of Canzoneri and Roger (1990) and Nicolini (1998). This variable, 
generally speaking, could be a proxy for political instability (Cukierman, Edwards and 
Tabellini, 1992). The probability of political conflicts is higher in urban areas than in rural 
areas. (ii) The size of a country is an important determinant of the level of tax revenue (Tanzi, 
1989). The size of the country is measured by the size of its population. The bigger countries 
tend to have more complex fiscal systems, thus have relatively more inefficient fiscal system. 
Thus the size of a country could have a positive effect on seigniorage. If we suppose, 
however, that there is economy of scale in public administrations, the average costs of 
collecting tax is decreasing. In this case the relationship between the size of a country and 
seigniorage is negative. (iii) The GDP per capita. More advanced countries usually tend to 
have more ability to design more sophisticated and efficient fiscal systems. Thus GDP per 
capita is expected to be correlated negatively with seigniorage. (iv) The trade openness is 
measured as the sum of imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP. The expected effect of 
trade openness on seigniorage is negative. In many developing countries, imports and exports 
represent important tax bases which are easy to tax and incur low administration costs. In 
addition, in more open countries the elasticity of demand of money in inflation rate is higher. 
More openness makes foreign currencies available. This increases the substitution between 
moneys. In this case the optimal inflation rate is lower in more open economies (Romer, 
1993). (v) Institutional constraints limit monetary creation. The aim is to control for the CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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exchange regime. One way to do this is to introduce dummies for the exchange regimes. The 
problem, however, is that the exchange regime could be determined endogenously thus one 
has to take the exchange regime at the beginning of the period. In this study, we have to take 
the exchange regime of the early 70s. This is not pertinent because it does not take into 
account the evolution, over time, of the exchange regime. Having said that, we constructed a 
dummy which takes the value of one if the country belongs to the CFA zone and zero 
otherwise. This exchange regime is exogenously determined. The expected coefficient of this 
dummy is negative. In the following regressions, all variables are expressed in logarithm 
except the CFA dummy. Thus the coefficient of each variable can be interpreted as the 
elasticity (except CFA dummy).  
The relationship between public spending and inflation tax 
First, we tested the implications of Phelps hypothesis for the forty selected developing 
countries then for the whole sample. The results are shown in the table III. The variables were 
averaged for the whole period (1970-1999) and for the three sub-periods each of ten years 
(1970-1979, 1980-1989 and 1990-1999). The sample was divided into sub-periods (seventies, 
eighties and nineties), this allows to introduce in the equations time dummies for each sub-
period and allow to use panel data properties.  
As predicted by the theory, there is a highly significant positive relationship between 
public spending and inflation tax. The results are robust for the sub-group of forty countries 
(column 1 to 4) and for the whole sample (1' to 4') and with different estimators (OLS, OLS 
pooling, Random-Effect and Fixed-Effect estimators). The coefficient on public spending are 
close to 1. This implies that an increase in public spending of 1 percent of GDP is associated 
approximately with 1 percentage point increase in inflation tax revenue. 
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The relationship between tax revenue and inflation tax 
The other variable of the theory of optimal seigniorage is government tax revenue. 
This variable, however, is endogenously determined in the theory of optimal seigniorage and 
there is a problem of reverse causality between conventional tax and inflation tax due to 
Olivera-Tanzi effect. The Generalized-Method-of-Moments estimators allow us to control for 
unobserved country-specific effects and potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
The usual method of dealing with the country-specific effects, in the context of panel data, has 
been to first-difference the regression equation (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). We adopt the 
assumption of  weak exogeneity of the explanatory variables, in the sense that they are 
assumed to be uncorrelated with future realizations of the error terms. However some 
variables could be strictly exogenous (urbanization ratio and population). In addition to the 
internal instruments we can use external exogenous instruments (agriculture and 
manufacturing value added as percentage of GDP).  
There are, however, conceptual and statistical shortcoming with this estimator. We use 
an alternative system estimator that reduces the potential biases and imprecision associated 
with the usual difference estimators (Arelllano and Bover 1995 and Blundell and Bond 1998). 
The alternative estimator combines, in a system, the regression in differences and regression 
in levels. The lagged levels of the variables could be used as instruments in the regression in 
differences and the lagged differences of the variables could be used the regression in levels. 
Then in the following the effect of a given variable on the inflation tax is referred to the 
association between the exogenous component of that variable and the inflation tax.  
The results are shown in table IV, as expected the tax revenue is significantly and 
positively correlated to inflation tax revenue. An increase of 1 percent of GDP in tax revenue 
is associated approximately with 1 percentage point increase in inflation tax revenue.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
  20 
We estimate the same equations (as in table III and IV) but the depended variable is 
seigniorage as percentage of GDP (table V and VI). Generally speaking, the results are the 
same. 
III.  Conclusion   
The full econometric implications of this theory, namely the revenue smoothing 
hypothesis, is rejected for the forty selected developing countries. However, the Phelps 
hypothesis implications could not be rejected both for the forty selected developing countries 
and for the whole sample. An exogenous increase in public spending implies an increase in 
both conventional taxes and seigniorage. Countries with high rates of conventional taxes and 
with high levels of public spending have high levels of seigniorage. This suggests that in 
order to reduce the level of seigniorage and inflation in developing countries the government 
can use two instruments. The first instrument is to reduce the level of public spending. 
However many developing countries have reduced their public spending to the levels of 
“minimum acceptability” particularly in health, education and infrastructure (Ghura, 1998). 
The second instrument is to reform the tax system. For example, improving the efficiency of  
tax system, implementing taxes with lower distortions (shifting from trade taxes to VAT), 
fighting the corruption, etc. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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Table I. Individual Unit Root Tests  
The following table presents Phillips-Perron tests for unit roots for the three variables. A single asterisk 
(*) indicates that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10 percent significance level; two asterisks 
(**) indicate a rejection at the 5 percent significance level; and three asterisks (***) a rejection at the 1 percent 
significance level. 
Countries  Public spending  Tax revenue  Seigniorage  Inflation tax 
Argentina  --  --  **  *** 
Botswana  --  --  ***  -- 
Brazil  **  --  --  -- 
Burkina Faso  --  --  ***  ** 
Cameroon  --  --  ***  *** 
Chile  *  --  **  ** 
Colombia  --  *  ***  * 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  **  --  ***  * 
Costa Rica  --  --  ***  * 
Dominican Republic  --  --  ***  * 
Ecuador  --  --  ***  -- 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  --  --  *  -- 
Fiji  --  --  ***  * 
Ghana  --  --  ***  * 
India  --  --  **  *** 
Indonesia  --  *  ***  *** 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  --  --  --  -- 
Jordan  --  --  ***  * 
Kenya  --  --  ***  * 
Korea, Rep  ***  --  ***  -- 
Malawi  --  --  ***  -- 
Malaysia  --  *  ***  * 
Mauritius  --  *  ***  ** 
Mexico  --  --  **  -- 
Morocco  --  --  ***  * 
Nepal  --  --  ***  *** 
Nicaragua  --  --  ***  *** 
Oman  --  ***  **  *** 
Pakistan  --  *  ***  * 
Papua New Guinea  --  --  ***  -- 
Paraguay  --  --  ***  -- 
Peru  ***  *  *  *** 
Philippines  --  --  ***  *** 
Romania  --  --  --  *** 
Sri Lanka  --  **  **  *** 
St. Kitts and Nevis  *  **  ***  *** 
Syrian Arab Republic  --  --  ***  -- 
Togo  --  --  ***  *** 
Turkey  **  --  ***  -- 
Uruguay  --  --  **  -- 
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Table II: Maddala-Wu statistics for panel unit rout tests 
  Public spending % of GDP  Inflation tax % of GDP  Tax revenue % of GDP  Seigniorage % of GDP 
MW statistic   93,624  112,878  90,171  (--)* 
Observations  40  40  40  40 
 
Maddala and Wu (MW) panel unit root test of public spending, inflation tax, tax revenue and seigniorage.  
Chi-2 critical value at (1%), (5%) and (10%) are respectively (112,329), (101,879) and (96,578). *The MW statistic for 
Seigniorage could not be computed since some individual p-values take the value of zero.  
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Table III: Inflation tax and public spending 
  Selected countries  Whole sample 
  (1) OLS  (2) OLS   
pooling 
(3) RE  (4) FE  (1') OLS  (2') OLS  
pooling 
(3') RE  (4') FE 





















































































































2  0.4172  0.2814  .2477  0.1538  0.3367  0.2539  0.2451  0.1213 
Number of 
observations 












The dependent variable is inflation tax as % of GDP . t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are in logarithm, except CFA dummy. Time 
dummies, if significant, are  introduced (not shown).  
 
Table IV: Inflation tax and tax revenue : GMM system estimators 
  Selected countries  Whole sample 
























J-statistic  0.305558  0.311365 
Number of observations  40  104 
The dependent variable is inflation tax as % of GDP . t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are in logarithm 
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Table V: Seigniorage and public spending  
  Selected countries  Whole sample 
  (1) OLS  (2) OLS   
pooling 
(3) RE  (4) FE  (1') OLS  (2') OLS  
pooling 
(3') RE  (4') FE 




















































































































2  0.2034  0.1359  0.1098  0.1083  0.1721  0.1303  0.1259  0.1095 
Number of 
observations 












The dependent variable is seigniorage as % of GDP . t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are in logarithm, except CFA dummy . Time 
dummies, if significant, are  introduced (tot shown). 
 
Table VI: Seigniorage and Tax revenue : GMM system estimators 
  Selected countries  Whole sample 
























J-statistic  0.343356  0.160509 
Number of observations   40  111 
The dependent variable is seigniorage as % of GDP . t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are in logarithm CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.07 
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